WHO CHANGES THE SONG OF THE CUCKOO IN SPRING? OR ON ORDER AND TIME

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Abstract: In Indian culture, the concept of *pratibhā*, generally known as intuition, accommodates a number of meanings and undertakings: from basic, intuitive knowledge to the highly refined, intuitive, and visionary force of understanding the reality of the mystic seers and yogis. According to the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (cc 460–510 AD), *pratibhā* is the groundwork for defining the role of language in cognition from both grammatical and philosophical perspectives. *Pratibhā* is also, in Bhartṛhari's view, an innate primordial knowledge rooted in all living beings, from the highest to the lowest, including animals and birds, which makes them give course to their natural action in due time. *Pratibhā* changes the sound of the male cuckoo to their appealing songs in the springtime or drives them to build their nests, lay their eggs, and bring up their offspring.

This paper explores the inborn aspects of the *pratibhā* type of knowledge and dwells on its fundamental feature, which is non-sequential and a lack of time development as it usually manifests as a spontaneous flash of understanding. Furthermore, it seeks to inquire and analyse to what extent *pratibhā* might share or intersect with some common points of the Greek pairs of *krónos – kairós.*

Keywords: pratibhā, Bhartṛhari, instinct, order, duty, krónos, kairós.

In Indian tradition, the term *pratibhā* covers a particular line of thought that can be applied to philosophy, religion, literature and grammar in the sense of accessing and using knowledge other than perception, logic, and inference. In philosophy and religion – which go hand in hand in Indian culture – *pratibhā* is commonly understood as various degrees of intuition. In literature, it expresses the creative literary power; and in grammar, it stands, according to the grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari (cc 460–510 AD), for the meaning of a word or sentence (*vākyārtha*) which can be grasped in a unique effort of understanding. Abhinavagupta's (9th century CE) reception of *pratibhā* as "insight" is explained in technical terms as: "this consciousness, which is praised by Āgama texts as an 'insight' (*pratibhā*), as an 'evolving' (*unmeṣa*) and so on, stays in the interval between two dual cognitions, when the first one is already finished, and the second one has not yet appeared"[1].

In this paper, my interest is focused not upon the highly philosophical aspects of *pratibhā*, nor on the grammatical or literary importance of the term, but on one particular meaning of it, which is outlined by Bhartṛhari in the second part of his *Trikāṇḍī*[2], *i.e. Vākyapadīya.* I explore the concept of *pratibhā* as understood as that

[1] *Parātriṁśikāvivaraṇa*: *bhavati cedam astamityodeṣyadubhayakalpajñānāntaralāvartyaun-meṣa pratibhādiśabdamagītam*, *apud* Natalia ISAYEVA, *Early Vedanta to Kashmir Shaivism*, Delhi, Sat Guru Publications, 1995, p. 112.

[2] I have elsewhere (my unpublished PhD thesis, 2007, p. 6) adhered to Ashok Aklujkar's preference to consider Bhartṛhari's works I *Brahmakāṇḍa* (*BK*), II *Vākyapadīya* (*VP*) and III *Prakīrṇa* (*PK*) as one *magnus opus*, which Aklujkar, 1994, p. 26 names it as *Trikāṇḍī* (The three parts treatise). Scholars do refer or prefer, generally, to refer to the individual parts by their name.

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type of faculty which agrees in its main features to what is called instinct, common to all creatures and living beings (including birds and animals) driving them to follow certain behaviour patterns and performing several actions. The core of this concept is that having its source within, and revealing the truth not necessarily in an intellectual way, determines spontaneously what it is said to be doing at all times (*itikartavyatā*) within all living beings.

This work will also note that the underlying connection between humans and animals, which is constructed on deep level patterns based on time and order, is also visible on inward language structures. I will additionally establish connections between the performing duties (*itikartavyatā*) and the ancient Greek concepts of *krónos* and *kairós*. This paper initiates only general inquiries into this topic, intended to inspire further and more systematic research.

What is *pratibhā*? It literally means a flash of light – a revelation – and is typically found in literature to connotate a sense of wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness. G. Kaviraj, the scholar who was among the firsts to construct the framework of the comparative research on this concept, defines it as, "the supersensuous and supra-rational apperception grasping truth directly, and [pratibha] would, therefore, seem to have the same value, both as a faculty and as an act, in Indian Philosophy as Intuition has in the Western systems"[3].

G. Kaviraj identifies two distinct but allied meanings.

1. Any kind of knowledge which is not sense-born nor of a nature of inference (*anumāna*) or verbal scriptural testimony (*śabda*), where again it is possible to distinguish between a lower and a higher force. Ordinary telepathy and clairvoyance are instances of the former, while the latter kind is represented in the supreme wisdom of the saint.

2. In the other sense, the term stands for the principle of intelligence.

   The use of the term is restricted to the agamic literature where it stands for the Highest Divinity, understood as Principle of Intelligence and conceived as Female. In other words, *pratibhā*, otherwise known as *parā saṁvit* (or *cittiśākti*), means in the agama, especially in the Tripurā and Trika sections of it, the power of self-revelation or self-illumination of the supreme Spirit, with which is essentially and eternally identical[4].

For the 5th century BC grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari, the concept of *pratibhā* forged a whole spectacular career which would go on to be crowned centuries later by the Kashmir Śaivism (or Trika philosophers) Somānanda, Utpaladeva, and Abhinavagupta. Bhartṛhari's place and importance for the Sanskrit grammar has been rightly summarized as "the one who for the first time in the history of Sanskrit grammar offers an elaborate theory of language (*cf*. Cardona 1976, p. 304f), and more specifically, a full-fledged theory of grammar that gives a concrete and practical interpretation explanation of the grammar of Pāṇini"[5].

[3] Gopinath KAVIRAJ, The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy in *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (ABORI)* Pune, vol. V, nr.1 (1923–1924), p. 1.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

[5] Jan HOUBEN, "Bhartṛhari as a cognitive linguist" in the *Proceedings of the International seminar Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 2009, p. 524, note 1.

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For Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* is a means of obtaining the right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), as all other types of knowing (such as direct perception or the spoken word) are not always able to provide us with all of the information that we need to construct the whole concept of the object or idea. Interpretation based exclusively on logic, inference, or verbal testimony may fail to produce the truth or might aspire to fulfil what truth would have been for the minds of the scholastics *i.e. adeaquatio rei et intellectus*.

Bhartṛhari is well aware that what we grasp as the meaning of a sentence is not a mere concatenation of the parts' meanings, but a new meaning which accounts for every word of the sentence and comes in a flash of understanding, that is called *pratibhā*.

> When the meanings (of the individual words) have been understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place which they call the meaning of the sentence, brought about by the meanings of the individual words. It cannot be explained to others as such and such. It is experienced by everyone within himself and even the subject (of the experience) is not able to render an account of it to himself. It is something indefinable (*avicaritā*) and it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of individual words, covering the whole sentence as it were, it becomes its object[6].

From this point of understanding, *pratibhā* is an intuitive knowledge of a semantic unit sequence, rightly described by M. Biardeau as, "*manifestation ou actualisation d'une connaissance qui est déjà la et qui, seule, donne aux moyennes externes leur fécondité : c'est à la fois et inséparablement l'intuition et intelligence*"[7]. Bhartṛhari applies it to the whole pattern of human behaviour, which a step further in his demonstration, shows that this type of knowing is also common to animals.

> Whether the intuition is directly produced by the word or by the result of the impulsions (*bhāvana*), no one deviates from it where duty is concerned The whole world considers that to be the authority (in daily life). Even the activities of animals develop because of that. Just as some substance acquires the power to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without the help of any special effort, in the same way are intuitions produced in those that possess them. Under the influence of that [intuition] even the animals act. Who changes the sound of the male cuckoo in spring? How have animals learnt to build nests and the like? Who induces wild animals and birds to eat, love, hate, swim and so on, activities well known to the descendants of each species[8].

I see in this aperture of *pratibhā* as the sentence meaning an extended simile where the correlatives, "as/likewise" (*yat/tat)*, or "when/then" (*yadā/tadā*) although not present as such, have to be understood to help the understanding of the whole construction going from the verses 143 to 146. We should, perhaps read: "[As] when the

[6] VP II 143–145 *vicchedagrahaṇe'rthānāṁ pratibhānyaiva jāyate / vākyartāḥ iti tām āhuḥ padārthair upapāditām // idam tad iti sānyeṣām anākhyeyā kathaṁ cana / pratytāmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate // upaśleṣam ivārthānām sā karotyavicārita/sārvarūpyam ivāpannā viṣayatvena vartate //* transl S. IYER.

[7] Madeleine BIARDEAU, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Paris, Université de Paris, 1964, p. 316.

[8] VP II 147–146, 149–150 *sākṣāc chabdena janitāṁ bhāvanānugamanena vā/itikartavyatāyāṁ tāṁ na kaścid ativartate pramāṇatvena tāṁ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanupaśyati / samārambhāḥ pratāyante tiraścāmapi tadvaśāt // svaravṛttiṁ vikurute madhau puṁskokilasya kaḥ / jantvādayaḥ kulāyādikaraṇe kena śikṣitāḥ katham // āhārapritybidveṣaplavanādikriyāsu kaḥ / jātyanvayaprasiddhāsu prayoktā mṛgapakṣīnām //* transl. J. BRONKHORST.

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meaning have been understood separately, [and] a flash of understanding takes place which they call the meaning of the sentence (…) [in the same manner] whether the intuition is directly produced by the word or by the result of the impulsions (*bhāvanā*), no one deviates from it where duty is concerned. Even animals are guided by this intuition, etc.". Likewise, in ontological realms, the terms could be reversed, and the demonstration could start from the general to the particular.

The next questions that would shed more light (no matter how tautological they might sound) upon this type of knowing and acting are: "What is the source of this mysterious force that resides within?" and, "How is it produced?" Bhartṛhari says that [*pratibhā*] comes from *āgama*, the Tradition. "This Intuition is the result of Tradition, accompanied by *bhāvanā*. The Tradition is differentiated inasmuch as it proximate or remote"[9]. Both the commentary (*vṛtti*) and Puṇyarāja's commentary are rather scarce and speculative at this point. Puṇyarāja thinks that by *āgama,* Bhartṛhari refers to the words of Tradition, yet whether this word is the Vedic word alone, is a question he avoids.

There are strong voices[10] who upheld the understanding of Bhartṛhari as a staunch advocate of the Vedic tradition who repeatedly stressed on the words gaining authority and power as composing Vedic hymns and being parts of the Vedic statements and injunctions. Thus, *pratibhā* can also be the meaning of the sentence in its linguistic import, not only its ontological one. There are several places where Bhartṛhari shows his commitment to defending and preserving the genuine tradition, which was dying because his forerunner grammarians based on "dry reasoning" handed it down in a very simplified form due to their lack of knowledge. Thankfully, the tradition was preserved as a mere collection until Bhartṛhari's master, Ācarya Candra, succeeded with the help of the Mountain tradition[11] to restore it to its own spirit[12]. Would this tradition be the grammatical tradition alone? I have previously inquired into its deeper, yogic-oriented origin and affiliation[13]. How does this tradition, which

[9] VP II 151 *bhāvanānugatādetadāgamādeva jāyate / āsattiviprakarṣābhyāmāgamastu viśiṣyate.*

[10] Johannes BRONKHORST, *The Peacock egg,* in *Philosophy East and West*, University of Hawai'i, vol. 51, 2001, nr. 4, p.15–17, says: "…according to Bhartṛhari, injunctions and other rules are somehow built into the phenomenal world. Individual words do not constitute injunctions, or *śāstras*, or rules of behaviour for animals and men. And it is through its sentences that the Veda becomes what it is. If the word is created, and organized, in accordance with the Veda, Vedic sentences must be meant, not just individual Vedic words. (…) Bhartṛhari may have been one of the first truly "Vedic" philosophers. He joined the philosophical debate, took up the challenges that occupied the other thinkers of his time, and constructed a system that gave a place of honour to the Veda and to the way of life it represented to its followers. Indeed, Bhartṛhari maintains that the word has been created in accordance with the Veda, including the Vedic injunctions. Correct Brahmanical behaviour is therefore anchored in the nature of the word itself, no less than the song of the cuckoo".

[11] According to Puṇyarāja, the commentator of the VP, the "mountain tradition" refers to Trikūṭa, a triple peak hill from the region of Jammu and Kashmir. The belief goes that on that mountain the original grammatical tradition, which was composed by the mythical Rāvaṇa and was engraved on stone, existed. From there, it was brought down and gave it to Ācārya Candra and to Vasurāta who were capable to understand it in its fullest and they imparted to their disciples. The Trika philosophers mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Utpaladeva, Somānanda and mostly Abhinavagupta have elaborated extensively this grammatical tradition from their non-dualistic philosophy of language perspective.

[12] VP 479–483 *baijisaubhavaharyakṣaiḥ śuṣkatarkānusārabhiḥ / ārṣe viviplavite granthe saṁgrahapratikacuke // yaḥ patañjalaliśiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamaḥ / kāle sa dākṣiṇātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ // parvatāgamaṁ labdhvā bhāṣyabījānusāribhiḥ / sa nīto bahumanatvaṁ candrācaryadibhiḥ punaḥ / nyāprasthānamārgāstānabhyasya svaṁ ca darśanam / praṇito guruṇāsmakamayāmāgamasaṁgraḥ //*

[13] Florina DOBRE-BRAT, Śabda saṁskāra, a mere grammatical technique? in *Proceedings of the International Symposium The Book. Romania. Europe*, 2010, pp. 493–501, 2010. *Vide* also M. FERRANTE, *How to Obtain Salvation through Language. Bhartṛhari on Śabdapūrvayoga* (provisional version), http: [www.academia.edu], 2014, pp. 157–172.

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manifests itself in the shape of the uttered Word, act as a force existing within all living beings at "one end and the sages at the other"[14]?

In Bhartṛhari's view, *Āgama* presents itself in the form of all of the Revelation (*śruti*) texts – by which the texts based on Revelation (*smṛti*) are supported – as well as on the authority of the cultured, elite brahmāṇas (*śiṣṭas*), their beliefs and knowledge not always committed to writing. However, for the grammarian philosopher the tradition is uninterrupted, without a beginning or an end. It shines continuously – like one's own consciousness[15]. It is also the last resort of the right knowledge (as opposed to possible errors arising from logic or inference). "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (*dharma*); even the knowledge of seers derives from tradition"[16].

In this particular case, which explains the *pratibhā*'s source and form of appearance, *āgama* is understood as *śabda* which is accompanied by *bhāvanā*[17]. The term *śabda bhāvanā*, or *bhāvanā* is a common term to many of the Indian philosophical schools. Mīmāṁsā distinguishes between a creative, verbal energy and an end-creative energy which finds its representation in what has to be done (*itikartavyatā*).

> Creative energy means a particular activity or a productive agent (*bhāvayitā*), which is conducive or favourable to the coming-into-being or production of that which is to come into being, [that is, an effect]. That creative energy is two-fold viz. word-creative-energy and end-creative energy or actual creative energy[18].

In order to be effective, this verbal energy must consist of three elements: the purpose, the instrument and the manner of doing it or how it has to be done.

> And that the creative energy requires three elements or constituents, viz. that which is to be accomplished, [that is the end or aim], the means or instrument [by which *bhāvanā* accomplishes the end] and the mode, process or manner (*iti - kartavyatā*) [in which the accomplishment of the end is effected][19].

For the Mīmāṁsaka philosophers *bhāvanā* is that type of creative energy which is the result of a summoning action. It is contained mostly in the subjunctive verbal Vedic forms which drive one to take action. For Bhartṛhari, this type of energy is conducive to what has to be done and is used slightly differently from the two occurrences which we came across in the section explaining the source of intuition (*pratibhā*). In the first appearance (II 146), *pratibhā* is used disjunctively next to the direct word (*sākṣat śabda)* which might also refer not only to the Vedic words but to

[14] S. IYER, *Bhartṛhari. A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries*, Pune, Deccan College Post Graduate and Research Institute, 1992, p. 93 and the quotation continues as "though it is the same principle right through".

[15] BK I 41 *caitanyamiva yaścāyavicchedena vartate/āgamastamupasīno hetuvādairna bādhyate //*

[16] BK I 30 *na ca āgamad ṛte dharmas tarkena vyavatiṣṭhate/ ṛṣīnām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam //*

[17] VP II.151 *bhāvanānugatādetadāgamādeva jayate/āsattīprakarśābhyāmāgamastuviśiṣyate* //

[18] Artha SAṀGRAHA I 5: *bhāvana nāma bhaviturbhanvānukulo bhāvayiturvyāparaviśeṣaḥ, sā dvividhā. śabdibhāvana ārthī bhāvana ceti*, transl. by A.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR & R.D. KARMANKAR, 1934, reprint 1998.

[19] Artha SAṀGRAHA I.7 *sā ca bhāvanāṁśatrayamapekṣate sādhyaṁ sādhanamitikartavyatām ca, kiṁ bhavayet kena bhavayet katham bhavayediti*.

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the words of day to day speech (*vyavahāra loke*). In the latter verse (*kārikā*) (II 151), *pratibhā* appears to be following closely the words of the Tradition, and thus it falls into the Mīmāṁsā's understanding of the *śabda bhāvanā*. The term *bhāvanā* tends to be primarily understood as "impulsions" (S. Iyer, 1967), "residual traces of linguistic ability"[20], or "mental traces… which are not, or not always, the results of instruction in an earlier life"[21].

Furthermore, Bhartṛhari enumerates several types of *pratibhā*. His commentator, Puṇyarāja dwells inconsistently on some, while leaving out others. "Six forms of intuition are known: those produced by one's own nature, through the Vedic school, through practice, through yoga, by the indivisible (*adṛṣṭa*), or by a special cause"[22]. We could safely place the actions of birds and animals within the first type of intuition (*pratibhā*). The impulsions that drive them (*bhāvanā*) permeate their own nature (*svabhava*), as if "programming" them to take a certain course of action (*e.g.* the song of the cuckoo which changes in Spring). In psychological terms, an instinct is an inherent tendency to engage spontaneously in a particular pattern of behaviour, such as the male cuckoo bird changing his song in spring. In order to be properly identified as an instinct, the behaviour "must have a fixed pattern throughout a species and be unlearned"[23]. The male cuckoo song in spring is such an innate pattern of behaviour.

There is a rich literary tradition across the folklore of both old European and Asian cultures surrounding the cuckoo bird. His unique, onomatopoeic, bi-syllabic song and distinct migratory cycles caused similar names for the bird to arise across several languages[24]. In the Romanian popular calendar, the cuckoo's song can be heard from roughly the 25th of March until the Summer Fairies Day (Drăgaica)[25] (when according to some legends, the cuckoo transforms into a different, predatory bird). It is no wonder that Bhartṛhari chooses deliberately to use the symbolism of the cuckoo to note the order of time and actions of all living beings, starting with birds and animals, then continuing on to the relevance of the verbal dispositions of children.

Bhartṛhari points out that the duties (*itikartavyatā*) based upon words is known even to a child due to mental impressions which are acquired during a previous life. "In this world, what has to be done is based on words, even a child understands it given his verbal dispositions from previous [lives]."[26] Thanks to these verbal impressions *(śabda bhāvanā*), children are able to use their vocal organs, to breath, and to produce intention sounds and words which reveals the understanding and the will of speaking (deeply rooted within the inner light/force, their very own *pratibhā)*.

[20] B. MATILAL, *The Word and the World. India's Contribution to the Study of Language*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 176.

[21] J. BRONKHORST, *op. cit.*, p.13–14.

[22] VP II 152 *svabhāvacaraṇābhyāsayogadṛṣṭopapāditām/viśiṣṭopahitāṁ ceti pratibhāṁ ṣaḍvidhāṁ vidhuḥ //*

[23] David G. MYERS, *Exploring Psychology*, New York, Worth Publishers, 2012, p. 345.

[24] Ioana FRUNTELATĂ, "Dubluri și efecte de ambiguitate în lumea «lighioanelor» mitice românești" in Ioana FRUNTELATĂ, Gabriel-Catălin STOIAN, Emil ȚÎRCOMNICU (eds), *Caietele ASER 10/2014, Peisajele culturale din România de astăzi, actualizarea zonelor etnografice.* Asociația de Științe Etnologice din România, București, Editura Etnologică, 2015, pp. 198–210.

[25] The Romanian name „Sânziene" with two of the three etymologies underpinning the Christian reference to Saint John < *Sanctus (dies) Johannes*, a pre-Christian tradition related to fecundity and agricultural calendar of summer harvesting bridges also with another Christian Orthodox event that is celebrated precisely in the very same day, *i.e.* the birth of Saint John the Baptiser.

[26] BK I.129 *itikartavyatā loke sarva śabdavyaparaśrayā/yāṁ pūrvāhitasaṁskāro balo'pi pratipadyate//*

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Modern theories – starting with Noam Chomsky[27] – have strongly advocated for the idea of inborn human language dispositions. Every child is arguably born with a native cognitive capability that is both intuitive and creative. They utilize sentences as the minimal semantic unit – what Chomsky calls "common understanding." According to Chomsky, the child "sees" objects and develops a generative grammar to speak about those objects.

Recently, scholars from the field of cognitive science, such as Steven Pinker (1994), have described language as more of an instinct, rather than a form of art.

> Language is not a cultural artefact that we learn the way we learn how to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brain. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs[28].

Returning to our term *pratibhā* seen as the source of the semiotic behaviour patterns in case of animals there are also voices who disagree with Bhartṛhari's definition. For example, F. Tola and C. Dragonetti write "As an intuitive act of cognition *pratibhā* can or cannot be an element of an instinctive behaviour, but is not the instinct in itself"[29]. Yet, language itself - the spoken, the written, the sign language – underscores all conscious activities and is precisely where connections between mankind and animals can be formed. Throughout Romanian folklore, it is often said that heroes and well-established characters are capable of understanding the language of the birds and the beasts and communicating with them to ensure the success of their various endeavours[30].

The metaphysical grounds of *pratibhā* are rooted in the word as essence-principle word *(śabda tattva* or *brahman śabda-tattva*). The description of the word-principle is laid out from the beginning of Bhartṛhari's *Brahmakāṇḍa*.

> That without the beginning or end is Brahman, the Principle of Word-Speech, which is imperishable and it manifests itself in the state of things, from which the world proceeds to evolve. Although he is thought as one, he appears divisible because of his powers, and [although] his powers are not distinctive, he manifests

[27] N. CHOMSKY, *Reflections on Language*, 1976, p. 6–8.

[28] Stephen PINKER, *The Language Instinct*: *How the mind creates language*, London, Penguin Random House, reprint 2015, p. 16.

[29] Fernando TOLA & Carmen DRAGONETTI, "Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's concept of *Pratibhā*", in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, nr. 18, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 108.

[30] The animals' language, „limba fiarelor" in Romanian, is a common theme in many of the Romanian legends and old stories. The consistent fables literature starting from the Aesop or Pañcatantra should be also mentioned. What about the Hollywood American movies series of *Doctor Dolittle* 1967, 1998, 2001, 2020, to mention just one title of many that are based on the capacity to link to the animals' language? Leaving aside its frolics and savoury humour, or the Hollywood slang using brisk, smart, on the edge or ironic and sharp cleverness, there is yet room to see that for the contemporary instead of being an advantage is sometimes a burden that alienates the human able to do so from the other humans.

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> as if they are distinctive; that whose six types of modification such as birth etc., depend upon the power of time, they being the source of different type of existences, that whose unity, One, the seed of all [is perceived] as multiple: the agent, the object and the action, that for which the Veda is a means of attainment and a symbol. Although it is one, the great sages transmitted distinctively in different traditions[31].

There are strong similarities between this Word-Brahman-Principle and passages from the Vedic culture. One such passage is found in *Mahābhārata* 12.224.55 and 12.671.1

> At the beginning was issued, by the self-born (brahman/Brahma), the eternal (or latently existing) speech, which consists of the Veda, which is divine, which has neither a beginning nor an end (and) from which all proceedings (initiative or actions) come about" /*anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛṣṭā svayaṁbhuvā // ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ* //[32].

What would help in understanding the progressive/regressive folding and unfolding of the Word Principle is, no doubt, the word stages as described by Bhartṛhari in his verses. *Vaikharī* is the word that is audible to others. At this stage the sound sequence is differentiated, and it is the place where the utterance as well as the perception happens. It represents the speech itself with all his particularities according to every speaker. *Madhyamā* is the stage where meaning and the word are differentiated, but together still form a unity. The meaning of the word, the signifié is constructed with the help of a mental representation. *Paśyantī* which is called otherwise *pratibhā*[33] or *prakṛti* is the stage where there is no sound sequence, neither conceptualised word. It is considered the source of all manifested words and their meanings. The commentary also mentions the fourth and supreme stage, *Parā*, or *Parā Prakṛtiḥ* where all sequences and modifications are completely absorbed.

It's worthwhile mentioning the commentary of Puṇyarāja which equates the *paśyantī* stage of the word (*vāc*) with *pratibhā* which he describes as "the purest form of intelligence (*prajñā*) for retaining the luminous character" (*bhagavatī vidyā viśuddhiprajñā pratibhākhyā* VP II 493). As a further description of the mechanism of the folding and unfolding of the language in all its aspects – from the uttered sound to its very source, the *Brahmakāṇḍa* reads.

> Having reached to that purified state of the word, one goes to intuition (*pratibhā*), the origin of all word's modifications. From this state named intuition (*pratibhā*) due to its similarity to pure existence, by the repetition on the union with the

[31] BK I 1–5 *anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yad akṣaram/vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ//ekam eva yadāmnātaṁ bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt/apṛthaktve'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate//adhyāhitakalāṁ yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ/janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ//ekasya sarvabījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā/bhoktṛbhoktavyarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca stithiḥ/prāptyupāyo'nukāraś ca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ/eko'py anekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak//*

[32] *Apud* Ashok AKLUJKAR, "Veda Revelation according to Bhartṛhari", in *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, ed. Mithilesh Chaturvedi, *Proceedings of the International Seminar*, Delhi, December 12–14, 2003, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2009, p. 52.

[33] Vṛsabha, the author of the Vṛtti, the commentary of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, which is held to be by many scholars one and the same with Bhartṛhari, uses *pasyantī* as a synonym of *pratibhā*.

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previous [purified] word, one reaches the supreme origin where all attempts of modification disappear[34].

This is a congruous description of *pratibhā* in its whole both generating and regressing language potency which empowers it to what G. Kaviraj identifies as the second principal meaning as outlined at the beginning of this paper. Nonetheless, two main aspects underpinned by *pratibhā* concept that may overlap or conflict sometimes are to be also observed.

The first aspect refers to the fact that according to Bhartṛhari, all knowledge is intertwined and pervaded by words, "There is no cognition in the world that does not follow words. All knowledge appears as it permeated by words"[35]. Here the locative *loke* (in the world) must be referring to the *śabda loka-vyavahāra* (the use of words to communicate one's thoughts, verbal usage, exchange of ideas), where *śabda* (word) stands for both the internal and external aspects. The second fact is that this particular type of knowledge which we define as common to animals and humans, finds its expression not in words, but in their actions. We might term this type of knowledge as "practical knowledge," in accordance with S. Iyer's (1992) "le savoir-faire", as proposed initially by M. Biardeau (1964). It informs us that what is said ought to be complete or accomplished.

Keeping the second aspect in mind, I am certainly tempted to find in the expression *itikartavyatā* a resemblance to the Greek dialectics of *kronos–kairós* – in the interpretation of right, appropriate timing, and measure for one's endeavour. From its primary meaning of – successful striking a target in a deadly spot (either on top of the head ([*Iliad* VIII, 11.83–86]) or between the shoulder blade and neck [*Iliad* VIII, 11.326–30]) *kairós* took on different, but related, meanings (mostly revolving around an opportune moment, or a moment for acting). To address *kairós* is to open a philosophical inquiry into Time, which is well beyond our scope. For Bhartṛhari too, time (*kāla*) is the foremost of the powers of the word-principle (*śabda-tattva*) responsible for all six modifications as seen in the very introductory verses of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*[36]. Time is conceived as a power but it is one and the same with Word-Brahman (*śabda-brahman*) in its manifestation as a power because of its independent nature (*svātantriya*). One of the most relevant similes compares time to the master (*sūtradhāra*) who is able to control the moves of the birds he holds captive with the help of strings so does Time controls and carves out all the changes of the many variegated things of the world[37].

All things happening in time take form in what we call the past, the present or the future. Actions, whether resulting from pure instinct (as is the case for animals) due to their own nature or as a consequence of rational thinking, are completed in time. The duties underlined by *itikartavyatā* which are seen mostly as a result of a mental impression (*bhāvanā),* seem to share a natural state, an inner order that lies

[34] BK I 14 *so'vyatvikīrṇāṁ vāgavasthām adhigamya vāgvikārāṇāṁm pratibhām anuparaiti. tasmācca sattanuguṇyamātrāt pratibhākhyācchabdapārvayogabhāvanābyasākṣepat pratyaistamit asarvavikārollekhamātram parāṁ prakṛtiṁ pratipadyāte.*

[35] BK I 131 *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte / anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate //.*

[36] Vide supra Word-Principle description (BK I 1–5) and the footnote 32.

[37] TK III.9.15, prabaddh*āśca yāstena citrā viśvasya vṛttyaḥ / tāḥ sa evanujñāti tantuḥ śakuntinaḥ //.*

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with an inborn set of behaviour pattern whereas *kairós* refers mostly to deliberative, judgemental course of action and speech which involves a great deal of training. What links *kronos – kairós* and *pratibhā* as the source of what ought to be done, in our case for birds and animals, is that both concepts work at the deep level of intuitive time-space dimensions as sources of order and meaning.

Aristotle's vision on *kairós* – "the right moment is good" (*ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐυχρόνῳ καιρός*)[38] – underlines the very nature of performing duties based on intuition. *Kairós* can also be treated as a fulfilment of both proper timing and action based upon intuition. It is good for the male cuckoo to change his song in spring because it aligns with the time when men are toiling upon their land. Or in S. Achella's words:

> Kairós is therefore the good of time precisely because acting grasps time which becomes opportune and mature, and therefore decides what action to carry out. In this time, the space of praxis is freed. It is at this moment that the quantitative and qualitative vision of time are joined together: there is no longer a "time in which" – the neutral horizon in which the event simply appears – but "a time for". The character of time, determined by the past which constitutes necessity meets the intellect which introduces freedom of choice[39].

CONCLUSION

Among those things which are common between mankind and animals stands the capacity to express our relationship with the world in the whole of its phenomenological complexity, both empirically and ontologically. Bhartṛhari questions the nature of the agent that determines the accomplishment of the natural course of things in its proper timing. He proposes that there is an innate supra-sensorial faculty common to all living beings which can be labelled instinct, intuition, or a blending of both (*pratibhā*). Its manifestation produces the necessary conditions to effortlessly perform what must be done (*itikartavyatā*) and ensure the continuation of the natural course of things in universe.

Most interestingly, the same term, *pratibhā*, covers semantically more refined layers of human interactions with the ineffable, as well as gradual stages of comprehending the real nature of things. Language is one such conceptual tool: not exhausting reality in its own form, but connecting mankind to a fragmented, framed mental reality. For animals, *pratibhā* is more instinctual and occurs over certain patterns of time. The force of intuition (*pratibhā*) has the capacity of increasing understanding and connecting living beings with that which could be beyond their mental reality. It requires a time of its own similar to what the Greeks used to call *kairós*, the perfect union of time and order.

[38] ARISTOTLE, *Nichomachean Ethics* I. 6, 1096a.27 *apud* ACHELLA, S. "Time, Kairos and Choice a Contribution to the Question of 'Presentism' ", in *Ethics. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica,* vol. 107, no. 4, 2015, p. 796.

[39] Stefania ACHELLA, *ibidem.*

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